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THE MOSQUITO CAN BE MORE DANGEROUS THAN
THE MORTAR ROUND
The Obligations of Command
Arthur M. Smith and Craig Hooper
We must be prepared to meet malaria by training as strict and earnest
as that against enemy troops. We must be as practiced in our weapons
against it as we are with a rifle.
FIELD MARSHAL VISCOUNT SIR ARCHIBALD WAVELL
These words, penned in 1943 by the commander in chief of British forces inBurma during World War II, underline the reality that losses to malaria and
other preventable diseases among Allied forces operating in the China-Burma-
India theater far exceeded the number of casualties inflicted by enemy action.1
Today, as the global war on terrorism evolves, a similar failure to appreciate
noncombat environmental threats—including mosquitoes and other disease-
carrying insect vectors—will once again degrade combat effectiveness of
deployed forces. The significance of Field Marshal Wavell’s caveat was amply
demonstrated in August 2003, when a U.S. Marine Corps team, while conduct-
ing stabilization operations in Liberia, was hit by a surprise disease outbreak.
Almost 30 percent of the deployed military personnel contracted malaria, dis-
tracting military medical assets already committed
to supporting combat operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
DEPLOYMENT RISKS
Disease and illness will likely generate more casualties
than combat during military operations along the Af-
rican littoral, in South Asia, or on East Asian shores.
Up to 75 percent of the casualties suffered in previous
conflicts in these regions resulted from disease.2 Ex-
amination of U.S. Marine casualty data from Vietnam
alone reveals that only a third of hospital admissions
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were for wounds incurred as a result of combat action; two-thirds of hospital-
ized personnel suffered from diseases and, in lesser numbers, nonbattle injuries.
Malaria is a particular risk. Though the mosquito-borne disease has long
been eliminated from the United States, it remains, according to the World
Health Organization, one of the most significant health threats in the world.
Plasmodium falciparum, the most severe and life-threatening form of malaria-
causing parasite, kills more than a million people a year. The danger to American
military personnel is twofold. Malaria victims who have never been previously
exposed to malaria-causing parasites are at high risk of suffering acute infec-
tions. Symptoms of acute infection begin nine to fourteen days after an infec-
tious mosquito bite; they are characterized by rapid onset of debilitating fever,
headache, vomiting, or other flu-like symptoms that can be accompanied by
life-threatening complications. If the victim survives a first bout of malaria with-
out treatment, the infection then becomes a persistent health problem. Chronic,
longer-term malaria infection causes successive bouts of severe fever that, if still
left untreated, results in progressive deterioration and possible death.
The malaria threat is tied to the rate of transmission, and in most cases the
transmission rate depends on the local mosquito population. During operations
in sub-Saharan Africa, where mosquitoes are very effective malaria “vectors,”
malaria infection rates among unprotected troops may be expected to approach
100 percent, and if the infected soldiers are American, without prior exposure to
tropical diseases, a high percentage will likely suffer acute infections and experi-
ence life-threatening complications that require immediate medical evacuation.
These realities could easily render a U.S. military force ineffective without a
combat engagement ever taking place.
But malaria and other insect-carried diseases are not the only threats. Mili-
tary medical-care responsibilities for indigenous civilian populations bearing
other communicable diseases unique to their regions could further impact the
military medical-evacuation chain. Likewise, although it is not an acute phe-
nomenon, the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) has profoundly altered
the medical risk to troops deployed worldwide. Disease is a constant battlefield
threat that, if command engagement and interest are lacking, will endanger
America’s ability to project military power.
THE MARINES ENTER LIBERIA
Despite long international experience with expeditionary military engagements
in Africa and a thorough understanding of the malaria threat, a significant pro-
portion of Joint Task Force personnel inserted into Liberia in August 2003
(eighty out of 290 who had been ashore) experienced symptoms of malaria. The
actual malaria “attack rate” will never be known, since the entire contingent
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began anti-malarial treatment soon after medical authorities determined the
causal agent. A number of latent, “incubating” infections probably went unde-
tected as asymptomatic soldiers rushed to take anti-malarial medication. At any
rate, the outbreak was a blow to combat effectiveness, and though there were no
fatalities, several victims developed a dangerous complication, cerebral malaria.
In cerebral malaria, the blood vessels that carry blood to the brain are clogged,
and victims require mechanical lung ventilator support, intensive-care units,
and rapid medical evacuation to survive.
What could explain this debacle? Why did most deployed participants—pri-
marily Marines of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Quick Reaction
Force from the USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)—be-
come infected?
Investigators focused on a number of questions: Was the outbreak due to fail-
ure of commanders to ensure that members of the landing force took the pre-
scribed anti-malarial medication, Mefloquine, for the necessary duration of time
prior to their insertion into Liberia? Were the deploying forces properly trained to
operate in a nation where insect-
and water-borne diseases are
everyday occurrences? Did the
Defense Intelligence Agency’s
Armed Forces Medical Intelli-
gence Center fail to warn commanders of the Iwo Jima ARG about the locally
high rate of malaria transmission? Did Marines, having heard about a rumored
association of Mefloquine with violent psychiatric reactions in returning Army
Afghanistan veterans in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, willfully avoid their anti-
malarial medication? Finally, could the prophylactic (preventive) agent have
been manufactured incorrectly?
A consensus conference at the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery on Oc-
tober 9, 2003, revealed that the major contributory factors to the outbreak in-
cluded insufficient intake of anti-malarial medication and a wholesale failure to
employ protective measures.3
Blood samples taken from the 26th MEU showed that only 5 percent of af-
fected personnel regularly took Mefloquine. Blood samples from 133 Marines
were tested for Mefloquine levels at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC). Seventy percent contained breakdown products of the drug,
itself evidence that some Mefloquine had been taken in the preceding month,
but only 14 percent had levels high enough to be effective at the time of insertion
into Liberia. Only 5 percent of the samples indicated that the medicine had been
taken every week. Analysis of Mefloquine taken from Marines’ pockets revealed
that the potency and formulation of the drug were adequate.
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Logistical problems were responsible for some of the other failures. For ex-
ample, the 26th MEU had ordered bulk Permethrin insecticide for uniform
treatment before deployment, but the unit did not receive the Permethrin prior
to departure from the United States. Instead, the unit received spray cans of the
insecticide, which were then used to treat the desert-camouflage uniforms that
the troops had worn in their earlier deployment to the Middle East. In Liberia,
however, woodland-camouflage uniforms were worn, and only 12 percent of the
troops treated those. Only 27 percent reported using the time-released insect re-
pellant issued to them, and, making matters worse, none slept under insecticide-
treated mosquito nets. The Liberia expedition was a “man-portable mission,” in
which each individual had to carry everything he needed from the transport to
the deployment site. Permethrin-treated sleeping nets—a low-tech item previ-
ously shown to dramatically cut malaria mortality in West Africa—were not
even taken ashore. In addition, many troops were reluctant to use the long-
acting insect repellant DEET on the grounds that the repellant was too greasy
for hot-weather operations.
The epidemiologic investigation concluded that better malaria-awareness
training and wider access to anti-malaria equipment are the best ways to prevent
future malaria outbreaks during deployments. Ironically, identical historical les-
sons, emphasizing the importance of individual, group, and command disci-
pline, have been learned repeatedly since malaria was identified as a major
degrading factor in military operations; all appear to have been forgotten. The
Navy and Marine Corps have neglected the war fighter’s long and proud disease-
fighting legacy.
BURMA 1943
The Burma campaign in 1943 was a particularly brutal sideshow of World War
II. But here, fighting under terrible conditions and at the end of a dauntingly
long supply line, soldiers served in what can be seen now as a battle laboratory.
Their experience laid the tentative foundations for today’s joint, combined, and
special warfighting strategies. Unfortunately, the innovative tactics explored in
the China-Burma-India theater were ignored for years after the war, and few
looked to exploit the innovative warfighting strategies pioneered in this margin-
ally successful theater of operations, much less recognized that the ravages of
preventable disease had bogged down the pace of operations.
Wingate’s “Chindits”
Major General Orde Wingate, a commander of the “Chindit Special Force” (and
a British military innovator) pioneered a brutal training regimen that quickly
shaped soft, poor-quality infantry into a cohesive counterinsurgency-capable
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force. Since the Chindits were expected by their commanders to endure all phys-
ical challenges, disease prevention was deemphasized.
Even during training, fundamental rules of sanitation and basic anti-malaria
precautions were ignored. That neglect caused serious losses; within a period of
six weeks one brigade lost over 70 percent of its soldiers to malaria-related hospi-
talization. Wingate,






One soldier recalled, “In one respect we had the wrong attitude to Malaria; we
looked on it as inevitable; we believed that we were all bound to get it every so
often. . . . [W]e never treated Malaria as a disease meriting evacuation.”4 This
prejudice ultimately became a self-fulfilling prophesy.
In some respects, the training befitted the Chindits’ difficult mission. The
Chindit Special Force operated as a commando unit, tasked to infiltrate Japa-
nese lines and conduct hit-and-run attacks against exposed railroads and
bridges essential to enemy operations. The soldiers were expected to be con-
stantly on the move, fighting without a base and supplied largely by air. The
troops were initially provided with anti-malaria equipment—full green battle
dress, anti-mosquito cream, head veils, arm-covering cotton gauntlets, and the
anti-malarial medicine of the day, Mepacrine—but these force-protection mea-
sures crumbled under the extreme operational conditions and because their lead-
ers believed that disease could be overcome by endurance rather than prevention.5
Full, extremity-covering uniforms were discarded, offering ample opportu-
nity for malaria-carrying mosquitoes to bite and transmit malaria. The men
preferred shorts to long trousers, especially when maneuvering in Burma’s broken
terrain; some cut most of the trouser legs from their battle dress. Sleeves were
rolled up and uncomfortable arm-covering gauntlets discarded. Anti-mosquito
veils were both ineffective and dangerous, offering little protection to sleeping
soldiers and restricting vision during night operations.
Chindits rarely had organized and insect-free sleeping quarters. For malaria,
this was a critical oversight, since most mosquito bites occur at night, when the
insect can feed upon unaware and unresisting hosts. Jungle hammocks provided
good shelter from rain and a measure of protection from flies, mosquitoes, and
other jungle pests. The mere fact that the hammocks were raised off the ground
reduced bites from typhus-carrying ticks and mites. Soldiers recognized that
hammocks reduced the rate of typhus and malaria, but again, operational
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drawbacks discouraged universal use. The hammock, when enclosed by a porta-
ble mosquito net, was difficult to exit in an emergency; further, the jungle ham-
mock and net weighed seven pounds and was bulky. In general, the jungle
hammocks, when available, were reserved for the injured and seriously ill.
The principal anti-malarial medication for World War II was Mepacrine
(known among American forces as Atabrine). Though it was relatively effective,
it was not fully supported at either the command or field level. Mepacrine had
to be pressed into service to replace quinine, a time-tested and accepted
anti-malarial medication, because by 1943 the Japanese had seized the quinine-
producing areas of Java
(Indonesia) and the Phil-
ippines. Military medical
authorities in India and
Burma were initially cautious about using Mepacrine as a prophylactic or sup-
pressive (symptom-reducing) anti-malarial, fearing that the drug’s potential to
conceal infection would encourage combat leaders to keep men on duty when
they were afflicted with the disease. Some medical leaders were also concerned
that overreliance upon Mepacrine would lead troops to neglect other aspects of
anti-malarial discipline. But the Chindits’ failure to adopt basic habits that usu-
ally prevent exposure to malaria-carrying mosquitoes put Mepacrine to the test.
Unfortunately for the troops, suppressive treatment with Mepacrine was not
carried out with complete efficiency even when the drug was available. No regular
formations and inspections were held to ensure that men took the anti-malarial
medication at the times and in the dosages necessary to prevent malaria. Many
personnel, in fact, refused to take Mepacrine. A myth that Mepacrine produced
sexual impotence or sterility was rampant among all Allied forces. In one battal-
ion the administration of the drug was suspended before troops went into ac-
tion, because its officers believed the drug would reduce fighting efficiency. Such
fallacies had a tendency to spread rapidly, become exaggerated, and gain credi-
bility during circulation.
Deliberate failure to take Mepacrine on a regular and consistent basis led to
confidence-eroding “breakthrough infections” when the level of Mepacrine in
the blood became too low to control the proliferation of the malaria parasite.
One medical officer discovered that the Mepacrine containers of two of his pa-
tients who had just died of cerebral malaria still contained the original quota of
thirty tablets at a time when they should have been almost empty.
The enormous amount of labor required to reduce local hazards of contami-
nated water, insect bites, and fungus infections of the skin—indeed the impossi-
bility of preventing them entirely during a long campaign—produced further
laxity, bordering upon hostility, toward medical discipline. The admiration of
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the line community for its own medical assistants was evidently counterbal-
anced by indifference and even resentment toward medical advice from the rear.
Command indifference to disease prevention denied soldiers the opportunity
to exploit incremental improvements in malaria-prevention technology. Mos-
quito repellent, oil of citronella, was initially issued in an ineffective and greasy
formulation. The uncomfortable repellant fell out of favor, and the Chindits re-
sisted later nongreasy and more effective counterparts. Command elements
failed to instill confidence in the new formulation, and no organized inspections
were held to demonstrate or ensure proper and regular use of the mosquito
repellant.
With the passage of time, the incidence of malarial fever attacks rose steadily;
few men experienced less than three attacks. The majority had as many as seven
malarial episodes—and many had to endure malaria attacks while actively en-
gaged with enemy fighters. The fighting efficiency and morale of personnel who
had experienced three or four attacks of malaria diminished rapidly. Dysentery,
diarrhea, lung infections, and skin diseases were more likely to infect, and after
infection to disable completely, a malaria-ridden soldier, compared with a soldier
who had not suffered repeated bouts of malarial fevers. Deaths from cerebral
malaria and typhus increased during operational deployments. The Special
Force, as a result of its aggres-
sive training and counterinsur-
gency mission, broke medical
discipline, exposing itself to
these preventable parasitic dis-
eases. Compounding the failure of disease-prevention measures, members of
the Chindit force gave up the suppressive benefits of Mepacrine. The medical of-
ficers, facing a situation that appeared insurmountable, gave up, allowing them-
selves to fall to the low standard set by the men. The casualty rate was enormous.
Just two-thirds of the Chindit troops who embarked upon Operation
LONGCLOTH in February 1943, a marginally successful four-month incursion
into Burma, returned. Ultimately, only six hundred of the three thousand troops
who commenced that operation were ever fit for military service again.
From a clinical viewpoint, the Special Force was more severely injured by ma-
laria than by bullets and grenades. Considered tactically, unit battleworthiness
was determined more by its state of medical discipline than by courage.6 It has
been said that the Chindit Special Force met a more dangerous enemy in disease
than in the Japanese army. Disease did more damage than the enemy. Even
Wingate’s substantial legacy of innovation was diminished by his failure in
Burma to ensure the health of his men.
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Merrill’s Marauders
U.S. forces in the China-Burma-India theater had similar problems. Like the
British, the Americans relied primarily upon Atabrine (Mepacrine) to suppress
and control malaria. The members of Brigadier General Frank Merrill’s 5307th
Composite Unit (Provisional)—known as “Galahad,” or “Merrill’s Ma-
rauders”—self-administered their anti-malarial medication. Each soldier was
expected to take a Mepacrine tablet on a daily basis, conforming to a system al-
ready developed for the Pacific theaters. But again, many soldiers failed to follow
precisely the protocol required if the medicine was to prevent malaria. Atabrine
indiscipline became a particularly potent manifestation of the poor morale
common in troops en route to the theater and within units experiencing their
first weeks of training in India. Unfortunately, command interest in reinforcing
individual Atabrine discipline was also lacking, often neglected until malaria
brought training to a standstill. Disease made morale even harder to restore.
The Marauders entered Burma in February 1944 with inadequate collective
anti-mosquito protection. As with the Chindit Special Force, little was done to
control malaria-carrying mosquitoes. Means by which individuals could limit
mosquito exposure—repellants and “mosquito bars” (protected sleeping enclo-
sures)—were unpopular and used by only a handful. Predictably, malarial infec-
tion and reinfection were rife during operations in the theater. The theater
commander, General Joseph Stilwell, exacerbated morale problems by pressing
his men to extend offensive operations and placing restrictions on medical evac-
uation. Gradually, fatigued and disease-ridden men began to repudiate Ata-
brine. It was a vicious cycle. The sicker the troops became, the lower the morale.
The lower their morale, the less hope there was of restoring Atabrine discipline
and curbing malaria.
As reported by a malaria expert on the staff of General Stilwell, the failure to
control malaria destroyed combat effectiveness. “It was incumbent upon any
medical officer surveying a unit with a current malaria rate of 4,080 attacks/
1,000 men per annum; with 7.4% of the men noneffective each week because of
Malaria; and 57.3% of the remainder infected during the past year, to consider
the unit as unfit for operations before adequate rest period and replacement is
provided.”7 The loss rate was unsustainable.
Few of the original 2,750 combatants endured the entire campaign. At one
point, the Marauders were losing seventy to a hundred men daily to malaria,
dysentery, and scrub typhus. By August 1944 only two hundred of the original
Galahad force remained, and these were utterly worn out.
Thus were the Marauders destroyed, not by mis-leadership, although it played a part
in the closing phase of the disaster, nor by the enemy. . . . Their destruction occurred
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on the ridges and jungle trails. . . . Of the three causes of the Regiment’s collapse, the
environment was the underlying cause. The tactical engagement was the precipitating
cause; and the invasion of the troops by disease was the final and decisive cause. To
an unknown extent the Marauders helped their enemies by their loose sanitary prac-
tices, by command ineptness in supporting the medical establishment, and by defi-
ance of Atabrine suppressive discipline. In the end, disease producing parasites
Amoebae (Dysentery) and Plasmodia (Malaria), as well as bacteria and Rickettsia
(Typhus) organisms, rather than Japanese soldiers, vanquished Merrill’s Marauders.8
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMAND
In general, mere mention of hygiene and sanitation elicits tolerant but bored
amusement from specialists in the combat arms. To this day, many senior offi-
cers are unwilling to accept the fact that hygiene is not only a function of disci-
pline but one of the basic factors upon which discipline is built. Personal
discipline aggregates to collective discipline; its absence in the individual pro-
duces the same absence in the operational unit.
The recent embarrassing experience with malaria during Liberian operations
once again demonstrated the historically validated and fundamental axiom that
training in the prevention of disease must be given top priority and be treated
like any other battle exercise aimed at attainment of an objective with the least
casualties. Training must be sufficiently intensive to ensure that all personnel
can be relied upon to maintain personal hygiene, unsupervised, during any pe-
riod of active operations. Without this, morale and fighting effectiveness will
crumble.
Malaria is a particular challenge; aside from the intake of suppressive medica-
tions, strict anti-malaria discipline must be enforced during training periods,
and any breach sanctioned. If compliance with expected anti-malarial measures
proves unwieldy or unrealistic, a unit commander is obliged to facilitate the de-
velopment of an engineering or medical solution. In operational theaters where
malaria is endemic, administration of anti-malarial medication and compliance
with personal and collective force protective measures can be ensured by eve-
ning inspections at the first indication of sundown, when mosquitoes are most
active. Such measures of personnel protection from mosquito-borne illnesses
must be practiced repeatedly until their observance becomes a conditioned
reflex.
The importance of effective command discipline was validated by yet another
historical example from the jungles of Burma during World War II. Like
Wingate’s Special Force and others, the British South East Asia Command’s
Fourteenth Army, in general, faced significant losses to malaria. A new com-
mander, then Lieutenant General Sir William Slim, took over determined to
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enforce vigorously a malaria-control program in the Fourteenth Army. As he
later recalled in his memoirs, “In 1943 for every man evacuated with wounds, we
had 120 evacuated sick. The annual malaria rate alone was 84 percent per an-
num of the total strength of the Army, and was still higher among the forward
troops. A similar calculation showed me that in a matter of months, at this rate,
my army would have melted away.”9
Lieutenant General Slim saw correctly that more than half the battle against
disease is fought not by doctors but by regimental officers. Those in direct, regu-
lar contact with the troops are best placed to ensure that personal anti-mosquito
measures are observed and that daily doses of anti-malarial drug are taken. Gen-
eral Slim initiated surprise checks in which every man in the unit was examined.
If men had not taken the drug, and if the overall results of blood tests for the
medication within the unit were less than 95 percent positive, Slim “sacked the
commander. I only had to sack three; by then the rest had got my meaning.” Be-
cause of this emphasis from the top,
slowly, but with increasing rapidity, “as all of us, commanders, doctors, regimental
officers, staff officers and [noncommissioned officers] united in the drive against
sickness, results began to appear. On the chart that hung on my wall, the curves of
admissions to hospitals and Malaria in forward treatment units sank lower and
lower until in 1945 the sickness rate for the whole 14th Army was one per thousand
per day.”10
As the recent incident in Liberia demonstrates, the global war on terrorism may
become completely paralyzed without a wholesale commitment of leadership,
“from the top,” to the environmental protection of the troops. Flesh and blood
remain the central element of all weapons systems. The will and physical capa-
bility to fight remain the crucial factors in any equation for victory. If command-
ers are unable to recall the hard medical lessons learned in previous conflicts,
and fail to ensure the health of their soldiers, how can America expect to con-
front bioweaponry or other, more dangerous infectious threats?
Standards of hygiene and sanitation are not only indicative of discipline
within a unit but are direct personal reflections upon the leadership capabilities
of commanding officers and their staffs. Regular care and maintenance of vehi-
cles are essential to trouble-free operation; so it is with human resources during
combat deployments. Unless the war fighter’s welfare receives constant atten-
tion, sickness and ill health are bound to ensue. In units where hygiene and sani-
tation are poor or lacking, commanding officers have neglected the interest and
welfare of their soldiers, and their fitness for command is to be questioned.
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